does the plaintiff.7 As a result, the defendant has a sharper estimate than does the plaintiff of the likely outcome of a trial.
It follows that the guilty defendant will be relatively pessimistic (compared to the plaintiff) and the innocent defendant will be relatively optimistic about the outcome of a trial.8 Assuming settlement is cheaper than litigation, disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only innocent defendants. Thus, guilty defendants will be more likely to settle than innocent defendants. Litigated cases will tend to oversample from the pool of innocent defendants. Thus, the selection effect predicts a tendency for litigation (where defendants have the informational advantage) to involve innocent defendants.
Another issue raised by this article is why litigation ever occurs. I argue that strategic behavior is a necessary condition for litigation. The reason is simple. Consider (again) the case in which the defendant has the informational advantage. If parties did not behave strategically, then the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within the contract zone for a guilty defendant would reveal her innocence. The parties would then settle on terms that reflect the defendant's true status. Thus, strategic behavior is central to any attempt to explain patterns of litigation.9
If parties behave strategically, it is unlikely that, in equilibrium, innocent defendants would reveal themselves by being the only ones to reject settlement demands within a certain range. In any such equilibrium, guilty defendants would have an incentive to reject similar settlement 7 In the model presented in Priest and Klein, supra note 4, which is the most rigorous presentation of the standard model, neither party has an advantage in predicting the outcome of trial. Although Priest and Klein do not address this issue explicitly, the assumption underlying their model seems to be that the defendant does not have an informational advantage. Alternatively, the Priest-Klein model assumes any informational advantage possessed by the defendant cannot be used to make a more accurate prediction of the trial outcome. Although these articles have implications for the selection literature, they do not offer predictions concerning the win rate of plaintiffs in trials. 8 For simplicity, the defendant who has violated the legal standard will be referred to as "guilty," and the defendant who has not violated the legal standard will be referred to as "innocent. 
The assumption that the defendant has an informational advantage is made in Lucian
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demands in order to appear innocent. It follows that the pool of defendants who reject settlement demands will include innocent and guilty defendants but that the innocent most likely will outnumber the guilty.
In sum, two propositions predict that litigation in which the defendant has the informational advantage will oversample innocent defendants. First, disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only innocent defendants. Second, the likely equilibrium of the settlementnegotiation process will be one in which the true status of defendants is not revealed. Given the predicted oversampling of innocent defendants in the pool of defendants who litigate, the win rate of plaintiffs should tend toward the probability of an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff (type II error). In this set of disputes, therefore, one should expect to find low win rates.
I also present a brief discussion of some of the evidence on win rates. I find that the predicted low win rates where defendants have the informational advantage is consistent with Eisenberg's data from federal court cases and with studies reporting the behavior of win rates over time in product-liability, antitrust, and employment-discrimination cases.'1 Two additional implications of the model are discussed. One is that, in areas where the defendant has the informational advantage, attorneys' estimates of the likelihood of the plaintiff winning-which, on average, will be accurate if they make rational forecasts-will be greater than objective measures of the win rate. This may explain the simultaneous occurrence of low win rates in malpractice and product liability and reports of widespread fear of being sued in these areas. The second implication concerns doctrinal change. The selection model probably provides a better explanation of some perceived doctrinal shifts than a model that attributes change to the efforts of judges.
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents the model, which extends the standard litigation model by taking into account informational constraints and efforts to rationally predict trial outcomes. I develop conditions under which litigation (where defendants have the informational advantage) tends to oversample innocent defendants. Section III discusses the evidence supporting the selection model presented. Section IV discusses additional implications of the model. 
where Pp is the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor, Cp is the plaintiff's expected cost of litigating, and J is the size of the damage award if the plaintiff wins.'2 The defendant's maximum settlement offer is
where Pd is the defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. It is assumed that Cd, Cp, and J are fixed amounts that are known by both sides. Since J is given, the stakes for the sides are the same.13 A sufficient condition for litigation to occur is (P -Pd)J > Cp + Cd.
Condition (3) implies that no mutually advantageous settlement can be arranged between the defendant and the plaintiff because their beliefs differ too much relative to the costs of litigation. If parties always settle whenever settlement is mutually advantageous, then condition (3) is also a necessary condition for litigation. An additional requirement is that the plaintiff's threat to litigate must be credible.14 If the plaintiff's threat to litigate were not credible, the defendant would not have an incentive to make a positive settlement offer in response to the plaintiff's settlement demand. The plaintiff's threat to " See the articles cited in note 1 supra. 12 I have assumed that the cost of settling the suit is zero. 13 One can easily incorporate disputes in which one party has more at stake than the judgment. An example would be a defamation suit in which part of the plaintiff's gain from bringing suit is the value of being seen defending his reputation. 14 
B. Information and Error
Consider a dispute where the victim (plaintiff) has suffered an injury at the hands of the injurer (defendant). Assume information is asymmetric because the defendant knows whether she violated the relevant legal standard while the plaintiff does not. Let W denote the plaintiff's rationalexpectations estimate of the probability that the defendant violated the legal standard, given an injury suffered at the hands of the defendant. The plaintiff bases his estimate of W on observations that are correlated with the defendant's level of compliance with the legal standard and on information concerning the probability distributions of characteristics a court would use in evaluating compliance.
Let Q1 be the probability that a defendant who has violated the legal standard will be found not liable (alternatively, the probability of type I error). Let Q2 be the probability that a defendant who has not violated the legal standard will be found liable (the probability of type II error). I assume that15 1 --Q2> 0
No attempt is made to distinguish between the plaintiff's and the defendant's estimates of the error probabilities. To simplify, I assume that both estimates are the same and equal to the corresponding objective frequencies because they are based on public information. 16 The plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable verdict is (1) that the probability that a guilty defendant will be found innocent is less than the probability that an innocent defendant will be found innocent, and (2) that the probability that an innocent defendant will be found guilty is less than the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty. The assumptions are reasonable accuracy requirements. 16 For example, if the estimates of error probabilities are based on information concerning the predispositions of judges, it is assumed that this information is known to both parties. This assumption could be relaxed by allowing one party to have more information about the judge's "leanings" than the other. if the defendant did not violate the legal standard. PROPOSITION 1. If the defendant violated the legal standard, then her estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff will be greater than or equal to the plaintiff's. If the defendant did not violate the legal standard, then her estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff will be less than or equal to the plaintiff's.
The intuition supporting proposition 1 is straightforward. If the court meets the accuracy requirement in condition (5), defendants who have violated the legal standard will have a higher estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff than will the plaintiff. Similarly, defendants who have not violated the standard will have a lower estimate.17 The reason for this result is that the plaintiff forms his prediction of the probability of a favorable verdict by averaging over two populations of potential injurers: those who would have violated the standard (discounting the estimate by the probability that type I error does not occur) and those who would not have violated the standard (discounting the latter estimate by the probability of type II error). The plaintiff's rational-expectations estimate of a verdict in his favor therefore is less than the probability that type I error does not occur (the estimate used by a guilty defendant) and greater than the probability that type II error does occur (the estimate used by an innocent defendant).
C. Litigation and Settlement
An immediate implication of proposition 1 and the sufficient condition for litigation (see [3] ) is as follows. PROPOSITION 2. The sufficient condition for litigation is never satisfied in a dispute involving a guilty defendant.
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that (3) cannot hold if the defendant is guilty.
Proposition 2 implies that if all litigation were determined by the nonexistence of a mutually beneficial settlement agreement, then every instance of litigation would involve a defendant who is innocent of violating the legal standard. Thus, the win rate of plaintiffs would be equal to the rate of erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff.
The difficulty with this conclusion is that it ignores the information conveyed by the settlement process. We know that the parties will always choose to settle rather than litigate if the settlement payment is below the defendant's maximum offer and above the plaintiff's minimum demand. If only innocent defendants chose litigation over settlement, then the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within the contract zone for a guilty defendant would reveal her innocence. A rational plaintiff therefore would revise his estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor, so that it reflects the belief that the defendant is innocent. Since their estimates of the trial outcome then would be the same, the parties would settle to avoid the cost of litigation.'8 In short, if parties did not behave strategically, there would be no litigation. The disputes involving guilty defendants would be settled because the parties' estimates of the trial outcome-based on information available before settlement negotiations-would permit settlement agreements to occur (that is, the contract zone would not be empty). The disputes involving innocent defendants would be settled because their refusal to accept initial settlement demands would reveal their innocence. Now introduce strategic behavior. Suppose the plaintiff starts with an initial demand D1 that is in the contract zone only for a guilty defendant.'9 If the defendant is innocent, she will reject this demand. Surprisingly, if the defendant is guilty, she may also have an incentive to reject the demand in order to fool the plaintiff into thinking her innocent.20 Indeed, any outcome in which only innocent defendants reject settlement demands that fall within a guilty defendant's contract zone could not be an equilibrium because guilty defendants would also reject such demands.
Given the strategic behavior of guilty defendants, the plaintiff may not reduce his settlement demand to a level within an innocent defendant's contract zone.21 To see this, suppose the frequency with which the defen- Because S, > 0, the revised estimate will be greater than Q2, and the revised minimum demand will exceed the demand that would be offered to a defendant who is known to be innocent.
The possibility of strategic behavior suggests that litigation may occur because an equilibrium will not exist in which only innocent defendants reject settlement demands (alternatively, mixed strategies are necessary). The proportion of guilty defendants who reject settlement demands may be too high for plaintiffs to rationally offer settlement demands within an innocent defendant's contract zone. In response to rejections, some plaintiffs will bring suit.22
Among the defendants who reject settlement demands, the proportion of innocent defendants is SiWI[SiW + (1 -W)], and the proportion of guilty defendants is (1 -W)/[SiW + (1 -W)]. It follows that among rejecters of settlement demands, the innocent will outnumber the guilty if
which is likely to hold generally.23 An additional reason for predicting that (9) will hold is that rejection is a signaling device, likely to be used 22 See Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, supra note 7. Although Png's model offers a rigorous justification for the basic claim of this section, its assumptions are restrictive. His model assumes that settlement is a two-period game in which the defendant first makes an offer and the plaintiff responds by accepting or bringing suit. An alternative model is one in which the defendant makes the last move by deciding whether to accept or reject a settlement demand. In this alternative model, it is more difficult to make sense of litigation, especially litigation involving guilty defendants. The reason is that, at the end period of the game, each defendant would accept any settlement offer within the contract zone. It follows then that only two types of equilibria could result: a pooling equilibrium in which all parties settle and a separating equilibrium in which only innocent parties litigate. Litigation against guilty defendants could be explained in two ways. One is that some plaintiffs will break off settlement negotiations and bring suit before the end period arrives. The other is that the end period is not really an end period, given the likelihood of an appeal. 23 Note that (9) holds unambiguously for any W < 1/2.
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strategically when it is a strong signal of innocence, which is consistent with (9).24
The Influence of Uncertainty. A central proposition of the PriestKlein model of selection is that disputes in which the evidence points strongly toward either innocence or guilt are more likely to settle than those in which it does not. The proposition holds in the model presented here.
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff suggests that the defendant was far from compliance with the legal standard. In this case, W will be close to one, and Q1 and Q2 close to zero.
Under these assumptions, rejection of a settlement demand at best will send a weak signal of innocence to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would not have an incentive to make a substantial reduction in his initial settlement demand because, he would reason, very few innocent injurers would find themselves in the defendant's position.25 Since the likely gain from rejecting a demand within the contract zone is very small, a guilty defendant will seldom have an incentive to use rejection strategically.
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff suggests that the defendant did not violate the legal standard. Under this assumption, the plaintiff's threat to sue will not generally be credible, so that neither litigation nor settlement will occur. If the plaintiff's threat to sue is credible, settlement is likely. Since very few of the injurers will be guilty, rejection will be a strong signal of innocence, which implies that the plaintiff should be willing to reduce his demand to a level acceptable to the defendant.
The Influence of Legal Error. Instead of a reduction in uncertainty, consider a reduction in the likelihood of legal error. In other words, the evidence specific to each dispute is no clearer, but the court is less likely to decide incorrectly (that is, Q1 and Q2 approach zero). A reduction in the likelihood of error increases the distance between the expected liability of an innocent defendant, Q2J + Cd, and the expected liability of a guilty defendant, (1 -Q )J + Cd. This increases the zone of acceptable settlement demands for guilty defendants and increases the zone of unacceptable settlement demands for innocent defendants. The likely result is an increase in the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate. 24 Note that there would be no incentive for a guilty defendant to use rejection strategically when S, = 1.
25 A more precise explanation follows. The plaintiff's downward revision of Pp after rejection of the initial settlement demand will be significant only if S1W/[S1W + (1 -W)] < W. Moreover, the greater the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 -W)] and W, the greater will be the plaintiff's downward revision of Pp. If W is very close to one, however, the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 -W)] and W will be very small, whatever the value of S1. 
where N is equal to the sum of n1 and n2. This model suggests that innocent defendants should be the largest category of defendants who litigate. If the selection effect operates as anticipated by this model, the win rate (see [10]) will be less than the average plaintiff's initial estimate of the probability of a verdict in his favor.26
Is it possible to predict whether the win rate will be less than or greater than 50 percent, or whether it will fall over time? In general, the answer seems to be no. The formula for the plaintiffs' win rate (eq. [10]) can take any value between 1 -Q1m and Q2m. Plausible conditions under which the win rate will be below 50 percent, however, can be stated. It follows from (10) that, if Qlm is roughly equal to Q2m and if both Qlm and Q2m are less than 1/2,27 then the selection effect implies that the win rate will be less than 50 percent.
The behavior of the win rate over time can also be established. Imagine the existence of some technology that reduces the likelihood of judicial error, and suppose that it reduces the frequencies of type I and type II error at equal rates. The obvious candidate for this error-reducing technology is the stock of legal doctrine.28 Letting Z represent the stock 26 This follows from (6). The average plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable verdict is found by averaging Pp over all plaintiffs (at each point along the evidence spectrum). But the selection process described in Sec. IIC implies that, at each point along the evidence spectrum, W (the ratio of violators to injurers) is greater than the ratio of guilty defendants to defendants because a disproportionate share of the guilty injurers settle.
27 There seems to be no reliable data on error rates. Tullock, however, argues that a rough estimate of the "probability of error" is 1 1 -2(nl/N)]dQldZ + [d(n1lN)ldZ](1 -2Q) .
The first term in (11) is negative because n/lN < 1/2. The second term also is likely to be negative because the proportion of innocent defendants will probably increase as error rates fall (that is, n1/N will fall as Z increases), and Q will generally be less than 1/2. Thus, the win rate of plaintiffs falls with a reduction in error if the selection effect operates as predicted by this model.
The falling-win-rate prediction can be explained intuitively: the downward trend results from a reduction in the error rate and from a change in the mix of cases coming to trial. The win rate falls as the error rate falls because the number of erroneous verdicts against innocent defendants declines. Since the selection effect implies that innocents will make up the majority of defendants, the net effect of a reduction in error is a reduction in the win rate. The mix of cases coming to trial reduces the win rate because, as error rates fall, the proportion of cases involving innocent defendants will increase. The reason for this is that, other things being equal, a reduction in error will increase the zone of acceptable settlement demands for guilty defendants and the zone of unacceptable settlement demands for innocent defendants.
Two hypotheses emerge. First, assuming that error rates are relatively small, an observation of a win rate less than 50 percent is evidence that the selection effect operates as anticipated. Second, a win rate that falls over time can be taken as weak evidence that the selection effect operates as anticipated. A related, though weaker hypothesis is that the rate at which disputes are litigated should fall over time.29
The reason error rates fall over time is that, as doctrine develops, fewer issues relevant to the compliance question are left entirely to the jury. In the limit, the question of compliance itself is decided by the judge according to rules that have been developed in earlier cases. Some additional implications follow. In areas of litigation in which the defendant has the informational advantage, one should observe win rates that fall over time. Since the error rate falls over time, fewer verdicts against innocent defendants (who make up the majority of defendants) will occur, and the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate will increase. Where the plaintiff has the informational advantage one should observe rising win rates over time because, as the error rate falls, fewer guilty defendants (who make up the majority) are found innocent and the proportion of guilty defendants who litigate will increase. Where neither party has the informational advantage, a stable 50 percent win rate should be observed.
Informational distinctions often can be drawn for different categories of litigation. One distinction is between contract and tort litigation. On one hand, the informational-advantage question is likely to be less clear in the contract area because contract disputes involve issues that may give either party an informational advantage. Whether there was an intention to offer or to accept, the rules governing contract interpretation, and the doctrines of mistake, reliance, and consideration all require some examination of information that the plaintiff is likely to possess. On the other hand, some tort disputes involve only the defendant's level of compliance. In these disputes, defendants will most likely have the informational advantage. Within the set of tort disputes, further distinctions can be made. Disputes involving issues of contributory or comparative negli- Table A2 may reveal another distinction among the tort disputes: win rates are lower in negligence/contributory-negligence jurisdictions. The relatively low plaintiff win rates in the "vehicular accidents" column for the Missouri counties may reflect the fact that, over most of the period covered, these counties had a contributory-negligence system while most other jurisdictions in the sample had comparative-negligence systems. See Daniels & Martin, supra note 30, at 331-32. One could argue that, because the informational requirements of comparative negligence are greater (degrees of negligence must be assessed under comparative negligence, while any significant negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars recovery under contributory negligence), the data are entirely consistent with the theory presented in this article. This is not clearly supported by Table A2 , however, because the data measure gross instead of net awards. It is possible that the difference between measured win rates under comparative and contributory negligence in large part reflects the method of measuring awards. 33 The low win rate reported in Table Al for antitrust cases is a consistent finding (indeed, the figure in Table Al is 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND LITIGATION
The Priest-Klein selection model implies that win rates should be 50 percent generally, and that deviations from 50 percent can be explained by differential stakes. The data ("disaggregated" into subfields of litigation) reported in the Eisenberg and the Daniels and Martin studies seem to be inconsistent with this hypothesis, unless one believes that the vast majority of areas of litigation involve parties who have different stakes.34 The theory presented here is consistent with the disaggregated pattern of win rates and has the advantage of not being reducible to the claim that each win rate can be explained only by litigant-specific factors. The low win rates observed in antitrust, malpractice, and civil-rights litigation are not exceptional cases that need to be explained by litigant-specific theories; these are areas in which this article's hypothesized selection effect receives its strongest support.
There are other empirical problems with the differential-stakes theory. First, although it may provide a reasonable explanation of low win rates in malpractice and product-liability litigation, it does not explain satisfactorily the low win rate in employment-discrimination cases. A doctor who is a defendant in a malpractice dispute may have more at stake than the plaintiff because an adverse judgment reflects on the quality of her service. A manufacturer shares a similar concern about her product but also the concern that an adverse judgment will lead to additional suits. Neither of these explanations seems to fit in the employment-discrimination category. 35 The second problem for the differential-stakes hypothesis is, if it explains the low win rate in product-liability tort suits, what explains the high win rate in product-liability contract disputes (Table Al) ? The differential stakes theory predicts low win rates in both product-liability tort and contract disputes. To be sure, if product-liability contract disputes largely involve breaches of an express warranty, there may be less concern that an adverse judgment will lead to a flood of litigation. Still, an 34 It should be noted, however, that Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 7, suggest that their theory probably would not apply to comparative-negligence cases. Given this, the data in Daniels & Martin, supra note 30, may not be inconsistent with the Baxter-Priest-Klein prediction.
35 Of course, it is possible that a defendant who loses an employment-discrimination suit may be sued by others or may incur costs in addition to damages and legal expenses. For example, an employer who cannot use a certain standardized test because it violates the disparate-impact doctrine may experience a large increase in hiring costs. The probability of suits by similar victims or of an injunction that will increase operating costs, however, is small in the typical employment-discrimination suit-a discriminatory-discharge claim. See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991). It follows that the reputational consequences of the loss of a typical employment-discrimination lawsuit are likely to be insignificant.
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adverse judgment is a negative statement about the quality of the defendant's product, and this suggests that the defendant will have more at stake than the plaintiff.
The third problem (noted by Priest and Klein) is that the differentialstakes theory does not explain the high win rate in worker-injury suits against nonemployers (Table A3) .36 The informational-asymmetry model suggests a possible reason. These injuries are likely to be influenced by the care of both parties, and, since the injurer cannot observe the plaintiff's level of care, it is possible that the plaintiff has the informational advantage.
One might argue that the fact that awards are generally higher in malpractice and product-liability suits, even though win rates are lower contradicts the informational-advantage theory. Thus, it may seem unlikely that the low win rates in these areas reflect a tendency of "guilty" defendants to settle at higher rates than "innocent" defendants. Higher awards in malpractice and product-liability cases, however, are not inconsistent with the model. First, the awards are likely to be against defendants who have violated the relevant legal standard. Second, given the high cost of litigating in these areas, it is not surprising that average awards are also high. Only plaintiffs who can claim substantial awards will have an incentive to bring suit.
An alternative explanation for the win-rate pattern in tort cases is that weaker cases are being brought in anticipation of larger awards.37 There are several reasons to doubt this. The first, noted by Eisenberg, is that win rates are low in other areas, such as civil rights, without correspondingly high damage awards.38 A second reason is that the incentive to bring suit does not depend only on the damage award but also on the economic return from bringing suit, which requires subtracting the cost of bringing suit from the damage award (and correcting for risk, too). Unless the economic return from bringing suit is greater in product-liability and malpractice cases-and this has not been shown-there is no reason to believe that plaintiffs have incentives to bring weaker claims in anticipation of higher awards in the product-liability and malpractice areas.
Although the Priest-Klein prediction of a 50 percent win rate may hold generally in aggregated data, it does not appear to hold when the data are disaggregated across areas of litigation. 
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may provide an explanation for this difference. As one aggregates win rates from several litigation fields, the influence of any type of informational asymmetry characteristic of a given litigation field is diminished. Therefore, the aggregate win rate will approximate 50 percent as predicted by the Priest-Klein model, which assumes no informational advantages.
An additional though somewhat weaker prediction of my model is that, when defendants have the informational advantage, win rates should fall over time. Few empirical studies have examined the behavior of win rates over time; however, the three studies of which I am aware-one examining antitrust,40 another federal employment discrimination cases,41 and the third product-liability litigation42-reveal that win rates have been falling in these areas after an initial period of doctrinal development. The Steven Salop and Lawrence White study of private antitrust litigation reveals that the average win rate of plaintiffs fell from 17 percent before 1974 to 48 percent in the 1980s.43 Peter Siegelman's examination of federal employment-discrimination litigation demonstrates that the win rate has fallen from 1977 to 1988.44 James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg's study of federal court product-liability cases reveals that, after expansions in product liability over the 1960s and 1970s,45 the win rate has fallen over the 1980s.46 If the low win rates observed in antitrust, employment-discrimination, and product-liability cases are due to the selection effect, as described in this article, then the fact that these win rates have been falling provides additional support for the theory.
IV. SOME ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS
In addition to explaining win-rate patterns, the theory presented in this article has implications on the divergence between observed win rates and perceptions of the likelihood of plaintiff success and on theories of doctrinal change.
If the selection effect operates as described here, one should expect to find plaintiffs' attorneys more optimistic than seems warranted by objec- 
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area where plaintiffs have the informational advantage, one should expect to find overly pessimistic assessments of the plaintiff's likelihood of winning a suit. This hypothesis could be tested by comparing the average attorneys' subjective estimate of the probability of winning, say, a malpractice suit to the objective measures of win rates in malpractice cases. I am aware of no empirical study that compares attorneys' subjective estimates of the likelihood of winning to objective measures of win rates. Press reports and the liability literature, however, generally have reflected frequently voiced concerns over doctrinal expansion and increased litigation in malpractice and product liability even though these win rates have remained well below 50 percent.47 This may be due to a general perception on the part of attorneys that the probability of success is relatively high in these areas in spite of low win rates, which may largely reflect settlement patterns. Indeed, Peter Huber has claimed that the "likelihood of success rose from 20 to 30 percent in a product case in the 1960s to more than 50 percent in the 1980s."48 Since Huber could not have gotten his "more than 50 percent" figure from observations of win rates, he must have arrived at it through talking to attorneys. Huber's estimate may be a reasonably accurate description of the average product-liability attorney's subjective estimate of the probability of success.
A second implication of this article concerns legal-research methodology. Both my model and the Priest-Klein selection theory imply a potential bias in concluding from court opinions that the law in a given area is shifting to either a proplaintiff or a prodefendant stance. The selection process implies that the deterrent effect of a legal regime, specifically its ability to make actors comply with legal rules, cannot easily be inferred from trends in court decisions or plaintiff win rates. In my model, for example, innocent defendants will be most heavily oversampled among litigated disputes when potential injurers are generally complying with the law.49 Such oversampling could lead to a stream of court opinions that seem either neutral or prodefendant and, at the least, will influence the set of issues that reach appellate courts. A legal researcher who infers that the legal regime is shifting in favor of defendants could easily be wrong. The generally accepted approach of inferring a change in the legal This criticism applies to all theories that treat doctrinal change as the result of conscious efforts on the part of judges. Consider, for example, the claim that the modifications in nineteenth-century tort doctrinerevealed by the larger number of opinions discussing the level of care exercised by the defendant-reflected an effort on the part of judges to subsidize industry.50 This ignores the possibility that, over the relevant period, the typical defendant standing before the judge may have changed from one whose lack of care was obvious to one who had taken substantial precautions. The criticism also applies to the claim that judgments in favor of defendants in product-liability cases reflect an attempt by judges to reverse the trend of expanding liability for manufacturers.51
Judicial-effort theories treat legal doctrine as being shaped through the collective efforts of judges. They typically fail to provide a reason why judges would decide to work together to change a particular doctrine. In contrast, selection models suggest that doctrinal change is the result of an evolutionary process. Just as the characteristics that are most likely to be observed within a species in the next generation are associated with the genes likely to be passed on to that generation, the disputes that are most likely to influence legal doctrine tomorrow are those in which the divergence in the litigants' expectations-the settlement gap-is greatest. Under the Priest-Klein model, since neither party has an informational advantage, the disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will contain roughly equal subpopulations of innocent and guilty defendants. In the model presented here, in torts where only the defendant's care matters, disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will contain a disproportionate share of innocent defendants. This imbalance should influence the menu of issues reaching appellate courts.
V. CONCLUSION
This article offers a new theory of the distinction between settled and litigated cases. The standard theory predicts a 50 percent win rate for plaintiffs. My theory predicts that the plaintiff win rate will be less than 50 percent in areas where defendants have the informational advantage in litigation and greater than 50 percent if the converse holds. A 50 percent win rate will be observed in areas where neither party has the informational advantage in litigation. 
